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struction of CPLR 203(c) should not, however, go unheeded; nor, it
is submitted, should the majority's approach be interpreted as indicative of a judicial narrowing of the equitable recoupment doctrine. The significance of the SCM decision lies in the method of
analysis utilized by the Court in determining the applicability of
section 203(c): careful scrutiny of all facets of the claims, defenses,
and counterclaims asserted by the opposing litigants.
ARTICLE 3-JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE OF
COURT

CPLR 301: Application of the "doing business"predicateto acquire
in personam jurisdictionover nonresident individuals.
CPLR 301 preserves the predicates for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction that were recognized under pre-CPLR law." One
such predicate, the "doing business" test, permits the exercise of
jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries engaged in a continuous and systematic course of business within the state in actions not associated
with that party's New York operations.' 8 Previously, this jurisdictional predicate had been applied only to foreign corporations.' 9
of the original pleading, also contains the "transaction or occurrence" language found in §
203(c). See 1 WK&M 203.25, at 2-86. In determining the applicability of 203(e), courts
appear to focus on the facts underlying the claims rather than the legal theories upon which
the causes of action are founded. See, e.g., Town Bd. v. National Sur. Corp., 53 Misc. 2d 23,
277 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1967), aff'd mem., 29 App. Div. 2d 726, 286
N.Y.S.2d 122 (3d Dep't 1968). The SCM Court, in reasoning that the facts underlying the
landlord's claim related to mutual mistake while the facts inherent in the tenant's claim
pertained to improper mathematical assessments, see text accompanying note 10 supra,
seemingly employed an "emphasis of the facts" mode of analysis similar to the test employed
under § 203(e).
,1 CPLR 301 provides: "A court may exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property,
or status as might have been exercised heretofore."
11See The Biannual Survey, 39 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 406, 413 (1965). The doing business
predicate evolved out of decisional law. It first surfaced in New York in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917) (Cardozo, J.), wherein the Court held that
a corporation which does business in New York "with a fair measure of permanence and
continuity . . . is within the jurisdiction of our courts" regardless of the origin of the cause
of action. Id. at 267, 115 N.E. at 917. See generally Prashker, Service of Summons on NonResident Natural Persons Doing Business in New York, 15 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1, 18-19
(1940)[hereinafter cited as Prashkerl.
" See, e.g., Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1964); Bryant v.
Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965); Curran v.
Rouse Transp. Corp., 42 Misc. 2d 1055, 249 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1964). In
Curran the court refused to extend the doing business test to nonresident individuals. Id. at
1058, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 721. A federal tribunal, however, in Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F. Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), applied the test to a partnership without
discussing the fact that it previously had been applied only to corporations. Id. at 712-15.
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Recently, however, the Appellate Division, First Department, in
ABKCO Industries, Inc. v. Lennon,"° extended the doing business
jurisdictional nexus to encompass an exercise of jurisdiction over a
nonresident individual.
ABKCO Industries, a former theatrical manager of the Beatles,
instituted an action against the individual members of that wellknown singing group.2 ' Plaintiff sought to recover money allegedly
due for services performed and funds advanced during the period
that it managed the group under a contract entered into in London. 22 Richard Starkey, one of the named defendants, was served in
England pursuant to CPLR 301 on the theory that he was doing
business in New York.? Dean Joseph McLaughlin, serving as referee, initially determined that Starkey could not be served under
CPLR 301 since "'jurisdiction over an individual cannot rest on a
finding that he is doing business in this State unless the cause of
24 While the
action arises out of that business.' ,,
supreme court conexposition of case law,"'
"accurate
an
ceded that this was probably
it construed CPLR 301 broadly, subjecting Starkey to the same
28
jurisdictional standards that are applied to foreign corporations.
The trial court held, therefore, that the doing business nexus could
27
be utilized to acquire personal jurisdiction over defendant Starkey.
The Appellate Division, First Department, in affirming the
trial court's disposition of the jurisdictional issue, maintained that
CPLR 301 was limited neither by CPLR 302(a)(1), which subjects
nonresidents transacting business in New York to jurisdiction in
actions arising from that business, 28 nor by prior statutory provisions.2 9 Thus, because Starkey" 'pervasively, unmistakably, unde' Id. at 712-15, 52 App. Div. 2d 435, 384 N.Y.S.2d 781 (1st Dep't 1976), modifying 85
Misc. 2d 465, 377 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
2, In

addition to the individual Beatles, the defendants in ABKCO included the wife of

one of the group members, the group's English solicitor, and nine of their affiliated companies

in the United States. 52 App. Div. 2d at 438, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 782-83.
22Id.
" 85 Misc. 2d at 467, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 364. Seven of the affiliated companies, see note
21 supra, were also served under CPLR 301. 85 Misc. 2d at 467, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 364.

2, 85
2Id.

Misc. 2d at 469, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 366.

2,Id. at 469-70, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 366-67.
Id. at 470, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
CPLR 302(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary. . . who in person
or through an agent:

1. transacts any business within the state. ...
52 App. Div. 2d at 440, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 784. The language of § 301 plainly states that
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niably, continuously and substantially'" did business in New
York,30 the first department declared, he was subject to personal
jurisdiction even "with respect to causes of action which did not
arise in New York."'"
Since the doing business jurisdictional predicate apparently
has never before been applied to individual defendants in New
York, 3 a question arises as to whether such an expansion of in
personam jurisdiction is permissible under the federal constitution.
Due to the fact that defendant Starkey retained attorneys and accountants in New York on a continuing basis to exploit his composing activities in the United States,33 this extension of the doing
business predicate seems to be constitutionally permissible. By purposefully availing himself "of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state, [and] thus invoking the benefits and proa "court may exercise such jurisdiction. . . as might have been exercised heretofore." This
was intended to assure that previously permitted jurisdiction was not to be superseded or
limited by any other CPLR provisions. See SECOND REP. 38. Some commentators, however,
have suggested that § 301 is merely a codification of previously existing bases of jurisdiction.
See CPLR 301, commentary at 7 (McKinney Supp. 1977). Under this view, prior limitations
on the exercise of in personam jurisdiction are also deemed codified in CPLR 301, viz, CPA
229-b which authorized service of summons upon a nonresident individual doing business in
New York only in actions arisingout of such business. The ABKCO court, however, chose to
give § 301 a more expansive interpretation by construing it to preserve the exercise of prior
jurisdiction without preserving such limitations. It is submitted that this is the better view
and more in keeping with the objective of the draftsmen of article 3 of the CPLR "[t]o make
it possible, with very limited exceptions, for a litigant in the New York courts to take full
advantage of the state's constitutional power over persons and things." SECOND REP. 37.
52 App. Div. 2d at 439, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 783, quoting 85 Misc. 2d at 469, 377 N.Y.S.2d
at 366. There are no precise criteria for determining what constitutes doing business. Courts
have indicated that the test necessarily must be a pragmatic one. See Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l
Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 432, 208 N.E.2d 439, 441, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 628-29 (1965). The instate activities must have a "fair measure of permanence and continuity" in order to establish
the nonresident's presence. See Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267, 115 N.E.
915, 917 (1917). The test does not require, however, that the primary activities of the defendant be carried on in the state; rather, the fact that an agent or employee devotes a portion
of his time to promoting the business interests of the individual in New York is sufficient.
See Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41,
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967).
It is important to note the distinction between "doing business" and "transacting business" as the latter term is used in the CPLR. The contacts required under the doing business
test are more substantial than those necessary to constitute transacting business under CPLR
302. See Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 288, 200 N.E.2d 427, 431, 251
N.Y.S.2d 433, 438 (1964).
31 52 App. Div. 2d at 440, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
12See note 19 and accompanying text supra. Dean McLaughlin has stated that, until
ABKCO, "all the New York cases involving 'doing business' have dealt with corporate defendants." CPLR 301, commentary at 7 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
52 App. Div. 2d at 440, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
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tections of its law,

' 34

it is submitted that Starkey fell within the

constitutional limits for the exercise of a state's jurisdiction over
persons. 5
Aside from the constitutional issue,36 the ABKCO decision
raises a serious question concerning the extent to which New York
courts should exercise their far-reaching jurisdiction. In resolving
this issue, several important equitable considerations must be
weighed. The crucial judicial task would seem to entail balancing
the need to protect state interests against the desire to avoid imposition of undue hardships upon nondomiciliariesY7 In the case of many
individual defendants, the scales will often indicate that jurisdiction should not be asserted.3" While application of the balancing
process by the trial court in ABKCO led it to conclude that jurisdiction over Starkey should be exercised,39 it is noteworthy that the
appellate division, unlike the trial court, did not explicitly utilize a

,

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958). In Hanson, the most recent Supreme Court opinion on the subject, it
was implied that when the cause of action was unrelated to the defendant's activities in the
forum state, something more than the minimum contacts test of InternationalShoe would
be applied. Id. at 253. Since Starkey's business activities were found by the court to be
continuous and substantial, see 52 App. Div. 2d at 439, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 783, it is submitted
that they constituted more than minimum contacts with New York.
u It also conceivably could be argued that subjecting a nonresident to the jurisdiction
of the state merely because he does business in that state violates the privileges and immunities clause. The purpose of that clause, however, is to prevent unjust discrimination by a state
against citizens of other states. See Prashker, supra note 18, at 11. The Supreme Court has
never held that this clause demands exact equality between nonresidents and residents;
instead the provision requires only that there be valid and substantial reasons for discriminating. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); Canadian-Northern Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S.
553, 562 (1920). See generally Note, Service of Summons on Non-Resident Natural Person
Doing Business in the State, 10 FoanHm L. REv. 126, 128 (1941). There appears to be no
inequality in acquiring jurisdiction over a nonresident individual because he does business
in the state, as this merely subjects him to the same power which a state exercises over its
own citizens.
See note 38 infra.
Individuals are likely to be more inconvenienced than corporations in defending an
action in a foreign jurisdiction. Therefore, the doctrine of forum non conveniens may present
a frequent bar to the extension of jurisdiction endorsed in ABKCO. "The principle of forum
non conveniens . . . [allows] a court [to] resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when
jurisdiction is authorized. . . ." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947). When a
suit is based on a foreign cause of action and one or both of the parties are nonresidents, forum
non conveniens becomes an important consideration. See Silver v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 29
N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972). In such a case the court, in its discretion, may decide that the forum is not an appropriate place for the trial and dismiss the
action. See id. at 363, 278 N.E.2d at 623, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 404. See generally Developments
in the Law- State-CourtJurisdiction,73 HARv. L. RFv. 909, 1010-11 (1960) (discussing the
factors considered by a court in invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens).
11See 85 Misc. 2d at 470, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 366-67.
'
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balancing approach, and did not expressly limit its holding to the
specific context of the case." Rather, the appellate division merely
set forth the general rule that an individual who conducts continuous business activity within the state is subject to in personam
jurisdiction with respect to causes of action not related to that activity.4' It is hoped that this holding does not signal an unrestricted
extension of the doing business jurisdictional predicate. New York
has in the past adhered to a "wise policy . . . [of refraining] from
imposing its jurisdiction too easily and unjustly upon nonresident
individuals ....
,,"2 It would be unfortunate if the New York courts
retreated from this position.
ARTICLE 32-ACCELERATED JUDGMENT

CPLR 3211: Court of Appeals limits use of affidavits where motion
to dismiss is not converted into motion for summary judgment.
CPLR 3211(a)(7) permits a party to move for judgment dismissing a complaint if "the pleading fails to state a cause of action. 43 Subdivision (c) of CPLR 3211 further provides that upon the
hearing of this motion, the parties may submit any evidence that a
court could consider on a motion for summary judgment.4 Since the
submission of an affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment is mandatory,4 5 the courts have permitted the use of affidavits
on a motion to dismiss made pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7).1 Recently, however, in Rovello v. Orofino Realty Co.,4" a divided Court
:0 52 App. Div. 2d at 440, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 784.
1 Id.
85 Misc. 2d at 470, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 367.

42

CPLR 3211(a)(7) provides: "A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more
causes of action asserted against him on the ground that: . . . the pleading fails to state a
cause of action . .. ."
44 CPLR 3211(c) provides: "Upon the hearing of a motion made under subdivision (a)
. . . either party may submit any evidence that could properly be considered on a motion
for summary judgment ....
45 CPLR 3212(b) provides in pertinent part: "A motion for summary judgment shall be
supported by affidavit. . ....
" In Rapoport v. Schneider, 29 N.Y.2d 396, 401, 278 N.E.2d 642, 645, 328 N.Y.S.2d 431,
436 (1972), the Court of Appeals utilized the facts contained in defendant's affidavit in
considering a motion to dismiss. For some of the lower court cases in which the court allowed
submission of affidavits to support a motion to dismiss, see Rappaport v. International
Playtex Corp., 43 App. Div. 2d 393, 352 N.Y.S.2d 241 (3d Dep't 1974); Hamilton Printing
Co. v. Ernest Payne Corp., 26 App. Div. 2d 876, 273 N.Y.S.2d 929 (3d Dep't 1966) (mem.);
Epps v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 21 App. Div. 2d 798, 250 N.Y.S.2d 751 (2d Dep't 1964)
(mem.).
47 40 N.Y.2d 633, 357 N.E.2d 970, 389 N.Y.S.2d 314 (per curiam), rev'g 51 App. Div. 2d
562, 378 N.Y.S.2d 740 (2d Dep't 1976) (mem.).

